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A large share of the UK off-course horse racing betting market involves 
winning payouts determined at Starting Prices (SP). This implies that gamblers can 
bet with off-course bookies on any horse before a race at the final pre-race odds as set 
by on-course bookies for that horse.  
Given the oligopolistic structure of the off-course gambling market in the UK, 
a market that is dominated by a small number of large bookmaking firms, we study 
the phenomenon of SP as a type of self-enforcing implicit collusion. We show that 
given the uncertainty about a race outcome, and their ability to influence the prices set 
by on-course bookies, agreeing to lay bets at SP is superior for off-course bookies as 
compared with offering fixed odds. We thus extend the results of Rotemberg and 
Saloner (1990) to markets with uncertainty about both demand and outcomes,  
We test our model by studying the predicted effects of SP betting on the 
behavior of on-course bookies. Using data drawn from both the UK and Australian 
on-course betting markets, we show that the differences between these markets are 
consistent with the predicted effects of SP betting in the UK off-course market and its 
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  1A. Introduction
1 
  It is often argued that horse betting markets share many common features with 
financial markets (Thaler and Ziemba, 1988, Shin, 1992, 1993, Vaughan Williams 
and Paton, 1997, among others). In both markets, well informed participants trade 
risky assets, and intermediaries play an important role in setting prices (Shin, 1992). 
At the same time, unlike more complicated financial markets, betting markets are 
bounded in time and yield a single and unequivocal outcome. Thus, betting markets 
"provide a clear view of pricing issues which are more complicated elsewhere" 
(Sauer, 1998, p. 2021).  
  In this paper we study the UK market for SP betting on horse races. In the UK, 
bettors may place bets with bookmakers both at the track (on-course bookmakers) and 
in bookmakers' offices around the country (off-course bookmakers). Most of the off-
course betting is carried out at Starting Prices (SP),
2  which are the odds offered by 
on-course bookmakers at the end of the betting period. Thus bettors who bet at SP are 
not only gambling on the outcome of the race, but also on the returns.
3  SP betting 
also seems to be risky for off-course bookmakers: Whereas on-course bookmakers 
hedge against the contingency of having a large share of the bets placed on high odds 
horses by continually adjusting odds, off-course bookmakers do not have direct 
control over SP. Offering bets at SP thus seems to be inconsistent with common 
models that view the bookmakers' target function as either guaranteeing profit at 
minimum risk or maximizing profits by outperforming bettors (Crafts, 1985, Vaughan 
Williams and Paton, 1997, Lee and Smith, 2002, Levitt, 2003, Strumpf, 2003)  
To explain why SP betting is nevertheless the preferred form of betting in the 
UK, we develop a model that focuses on the concentrated structure of the UK off-
course market. In our model there are two types of bookmakers: Large off-course 
bookmakers with the ability to influence market outcomes and small on-course 
bookmakers who operate in competitive markets. Our results imply that in 
equilibrium, the off-course bookmakers may choose to collaborate implicitly and sell 
bets at SP. Owing to the tacit collusion, SP betting allows the off-course bookmakers 
                                                 
1The authors wish to thank Arthur Fishman, Han Guowen and Daniel Levy for their helpful comments. 
2  Dowie (1976), for example, estimates that 95% of the off-course betting are made at SP.  
3 Interestingly, J.K. Rowling satirizes SP betting in "Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire." There, a 
bookmaker offers bets without naming the odds. and only promises to give "excellent odds" later. The 
negative attitude towards SP betting continues when the bookmaker cheats and pays winners with fake 
money. 
  2to manipulate the on-course prices and thus increases their expected profits.
4 Our 
analysis thus extends the results of Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) who show that 
sellers who face demand uncertainty have an incentive to collude in situations where 
both the clients and the sellers who face uncertainty.    
     We test our empirical hypotheses by comparing the UK bookmakers’ market 
with the Australian market. These two markets share many common features, with the 
exception that SP betting is illegal in Australia. We show that the data support our 
theoretical predictions in suggesting that the UK horse racing market is less efficient 
than the Australian market in predictable ways. Our findings are strengthened by 
recent findings on inefficiencies in the UK horse racing market (see for example: 
Gabriel and Marsden, 1990, Vaughan Williams and Paton, 1997, Bruce and Johnson, 
2005, Johnson and Sung, 2006). Our results may also contribute to the study of tacit 
collusion in concentrated markets (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1990, Slade, 1992, 
Borenstein and Shepard, 1996). 
 
B. Market Structure 
  Before developing our model, we briefly describe the structure of the UK and 
Australian horse betting markets. 
  In the UK, bettors may place bets with both the pari-mutuel or with on- and 
off- course bookmakers. The pari-mutuel market normally opens for bets around 24 
hours before races begin, and the odds are settled according to the final sums placed 
on each horse.
5 The off-course market is controlled by a small number of bookmaking 
firms, who operate a large number of offices throughout the country.
6 These outlets 
normally open for betting (like the pari-mutuel market) around 24 hours before each 
race.
7 They offer bets mainly at SP, which are the final odds offered by on-course 
bookmakers and are thus unknown at the time the bet is made.  
                                                 
4 Previous authors have already noted that off-course bookmakers may intervene in the on-course 
markets. Dowie (1976, p. 140), for example, notes that: "actual SP is thus determined by both off- and 
on- course activity." 
5  For more on pari-mutuel markets see: Thaler and Ziemba (1988), Sauer (1998) and Gandar et al. 
(2001), among others. 
6  According to the internet site Wikipedia, there are four main off-course bookmaking firms in the 
UK. In 2004, those four firms operated over 8,000 betting offices (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bookmaker), 
and  had a considerable turnover and market power; William Hill, for example, had a total turnover of 
over £8 billion in 2004 (http://miranda.hemscott.com/ir/wmh/pdf/p_and_l2004.pdf).    
7  The off-course bookmakers also offer betting at fixed odds. However for most races, they open for 
bets at fixed odds only around half an hour before the races start. The only exceptions are very 
important races; in such cases fixed odds are sometimes offered even months before the race.  These 
  3Unlike the concentrated off-course betting market, the on-course market is 
normally far more competitive, with 10–50 on-course bookmakers at each track. The 
on-course bookmakers open for betting about twenty minutes to half an hour before 
each race, and they offer betting at fixed odds. The first set of odds they post at the 
time they open for bets are known as Opening Prices (OP). As the market progresses, 
they often change odds in order to manage their exposure.
8 In particular, bookmakers 
often shorten the odds on horses that are plunged. A plunge occurs when a large bet 
on a horse is made simultaneously with many bookmakers; past research shows that 
plunges usually indicate the presence of bettors with superior information (insiders), 
such as horse owners and trainers (Shin 1991, 1992, 1994 and Schnytzer and Shilony 
1995, 2003, 2005). The last set of prices that the bookmakers post before the market 
closes are known as the Starting Prices (SP). As noted above, these are also the set of 
prices that determine the payouts for most of the bets laid by the off-course 
bookmakers.  
The Australian on-course market is structured in the same way as the UK 
market. The differences occur off-course, where SP betting is illegal and bets are 
made either at fixed odds offered on selected races, more or less as in the UK, or with 




C. The model 
1, Assumptions 
  Our model combines elements from Shin (1992, 1993), Rotemberg and 
Saloner (1990) and Schnytzer and Shilony (2005). It describes a market for bets on a 
                                                                                                                                             
exceptions notwithstanding, the vast majority of bettors who bet with the off-course bookmakers 
choose to do so at SP. 
8 In over 42,000 observations that we have in our UK data set, fewer than 8.5% of the runners 
maintained a constant price from the time the market opened and until it closed. 
9 Even in 2007, when there are legal on-line bookmakers in Australia, SP betting remains illegal and, 
for most races, the bookmakers offer the odds which are determined by the various pari-mutuels 
operating in the different states. These bookmakers compete by permitting bettors to choose according 
to which pari-mutuel they wish to be paid if successful or by offering to pay the maximum dividend 
among the pari-mutuels. Thus, to the extent that Australian off-course bookies themselves bet 
anywhere it will be with the pari-mutuel. It is interesting to note that UK off-course bookmakers do not 
compete by offering discounts from SP, although loss rebates are occasionally employed. 
 
  4horse race with   horses, labeled by the set {1,2… }. Each horse,   has 
(unknown) probability   of winning, such that   and  .
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Since our focus is on the behavior of off-course bookmakers, we define the setting as 
follows. First, there are two off-course bookmakers, identified as bookie 1 and bookie 
2. Each of the bookies offers a set of N tickets that are labeled 1,2…n. Each bookie 
chooses the price of each ticket, such that the price of ticket  { } n i ..., 2 , 1 ∈  sold by 
bookie  is  } 2 , 1 { ∈ j ij π  where  1 0 < < ij π . The i




event that horse i wins the race and zero otherwise.
11 We show below that in 
equilibrium, both bookies set SP prices rather than offer tickets at fixed odds. 
We assume that the goal of the off-course bookies is to maximize their 
expected profits and that they are risk averse in the following sense: 
Assumption 1 (Risk Aversion): The bookies always maintain a balanced book, 
such that for every ticket   the expected contingent payout is less than or 
equal to the total sum accumulated by the bookie. Denoting by   the total sum of 
money wagered by all bettors on horse i with bookie j, this implies that: 
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12 where E denotes expectations.  
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Where  ij α   is the demand for horse i at bookie j if bookie j's price is equal to 
the expected winning probability, β  is the marginal change in the demand as a result 
                                                 
10 Shin (1992) investigates the case where a horse has a probability of 1 of winning. However, in such 
cases bookmakers normally refuse to take bets. As our interest is essentially empirical, we do not 
consider such cases.  
11  Normally, bookmakers post prices in terms of odds rather than prices. The relationship between the 










=  where   is the odds offered on horse i in race t and  t i O ,
t i, π  is its price.   
12 This assumption is often made in the literature. For example, Crafts (1985, p. 295) assumes that 
bookmakers goal is to have a "perfect book," meaning that "the bookmaker… make[s] money 
whichever horse wins."  
  5of a change in the price and  denotes the expectation formed by off-course bettors 
based on all public information. We assume that all the off-course bettors have the 
same set of information and similar expectations about the prospects of runners. This 
leads us to follow Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) and assume that if the bookies offer 
equal prices they expect equal demand. That is, we assume that 
off E
) , ( ~ σ α α i ij N  and 
that, in the case of equal prices, demand varies between them only by a random 
component with equal deviations. 
We assume further that the off-course bookies have the same set of information as the 
bettors. Therefore, they also have the same expectations as off-course bettors.
13
 Since expected demand depends on posted prices, the two bookies face 
Bertrand-type competition (Carlton and Perloff, 1994), where bettors buy tickets from 
the cheaper bookie in an amount proportional to the difference between the price and 
the expected probability of each runner. Note that in the case where prices equal 
expected probability, the expected demand for each horse i is  i α . Therefore, under 
the (strong) assumption that we make about  ij α , it is possible to deduce the subjective 



































  Another set of players that exist in the model is the on-course bookmakers and 
bettors. We assume that on-course bookmakers maximize their expected profits and 
that the on-course betting market is efficient, so that expected profits are zero. This 
implies that the on-course bookmakers behave in a way that is similar to that modeled 
by Schnytzer and Shilony (2005) and Shin (1992). Especially, this implies that on-
course bookmakers know that there may be insiders, and protect their profits by 
increasing the prices of low-probability runners when the probability of plunges 
increases. In the empirical section we test some implications of this prediction.  
                                                 
13  This assumption can be defended on the grounds that off-course bookmakers open for bets a 
relatively long time before races begin. It is well documented that prices in on-course markets often 
change until the final moments before they close. This implies that unlike, for example, the US markets 
for bets on point spreads (Levitt, 2003), bookmakers do not possess all the relevant information until 
the end of the betting period. 
  6We further assume that bettors in the on-course market are better informed 
than off-course bettors and that they bet in proportion to their expectations.
 14 
Denoting by  the expectation formed by on-course bettors, we arrive at 
assumption 2:   
) ( i on p E
Assumption 2 (On-Course \ Off-Course Expectations): For every runner 
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Assumption 2 is justified on both theoretic and empirical grounds: 
Theoretically, if one assumes that the main goal of the bettors is to profit, then coming 
to the racetrack involves higher costs than betting off-course. Thus, bettors travel to 
the track only if they could gain additional information there, or if they were 
determined to exploit inside information at fixed odds in a competitive setting, or 
both. From an empirical stand point, on-course bettors have a better opportunity to 
inspect the condition of the runners, and also to observe the actions of insiders. The 
findings in the literature also support the view that on-course bettors out perform off-
course bettors (Figlewski, 1979; Schnytzer and Shilony, 1995; Gandar et al., 2001).  
Our remaining two assumptions concern the relationship between the off-
course and on-course markets: 
Assumption 3 (Off-Course Bookies’ Intervention): Off course bookies can change the 
prices in the on-course market by plunging runners. As described above, on course 
bookmakers respond to plunges by increasing the price of the plunged horse in order 
to avoid loses in the case that the plunges horses win. Off-course bookmakers can 
take advantage of this and because the off course market is much larger than the on-
course market. Off-course bookmakers can thus plunge horses on-course without 
offsetting their books significantly. Moreover, in the case that they receive large bets 
on horses with a low on-course price, off-course bookies can hedge some of their risk 
by betting on those horses, and thus doing so is almost always profitable.  
The last assumption concerns the ability of off-course bookmakers to observe 
the SP prices before the close of betting. In order to simplify the model we make the 
following assumption: 
                                                 
14 This is similar to the assumption made by Schnytzer and Shilony (2005) where they assume that 
there is a hierarchy of information. At the top of the hierarchy there are bettors with inside information 
and bet on-course, and at the bottom there is the general gambling public.  
  7Assumption 4 (Observing SP): The off-course bookmakers can observe the 
equilibrium prices in the on-course market just before the close of betting and thereby 
imply starting prices. Once they compare these near final equilibrium prices with their 
desired SP, they can influence prices by plunging horses before the close of betting. 
15
We therefore model the sequence of events in as follows:  
First, the off-course market is opened and the off-course bookies set their prices for 
each ticket.
16  
In the second stage, off-course bettors place their bets by buying tickets from the off-
course bookies at the price offered, according to the demand function given by (1) and 
their expectations about outcomes.  
In the third stage, equilibrium prices are reached in the on-course market and are 
observed by the off-course bookies.  
In the final stage the off-course bookies may plunge horses in order to influence SP. 
 
2. Solution 
  Each bookie sells tickets 1,2…n at a price of  i π , and pays out 
i π
1
 for each 
unit of ticket i sold in the event that horse i wins, an event that occurs with 
probability  . His profits on each horse are therefore given by (1) times the price of 
a ticket minus the sum he pays in the event that the horse wins. His total profits are 
therefore:  
i p















π β α 1 ) (
1
       (2) 
  Since the bookies have no informational advantage over the bettors, it follows 
that if they try to compete by prices, the only possible equilibrium is a Bertrand 
equilibrium with zero expected profits. The price of each horse in such case is given, 
                                                 
15 Assuming that the off-course bookmakers do not actually know the equilibrium levels but employ 
stochastic linear programming to determine the actions according to expected equilibrium prices close 
to the end of betting would not change the results, so long as the noise in their predictions was not too 
great. 
16 We assume that off-course bookmakers offer only one type of asset, although in reality they may 
offer a mixture of assets. For example, off-course bookmakers normally open for bets at fixed odds 
about twenty minutes from the start of each race. However, at that time most bettors bet at fixed odds 
and not at SP, and in addition the SP market is many times larger than the off-course fixed-odds 
market.  
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π  , 
and expected demand is  α α = ) ( ij E . 
 However, in this model, this is not a unique equilibrium. Assume (without loss of 
generality) that bookie 1 declares that he would pay bettors according to SP as set in 
the on-course market, and that bookie 2 follows. Note that we define the SP of horse 
 in a similar fashion to our definition of  i i π ; i.e. the starting price of horse   is the 
price of a contingent claim to 1 in the event that horse   wins the race. We show that 
this is a stable equilibrium. To see that this is indeed an equilibrium outcome, first 
assume that for every horse in the race, off-course bettors take the expected SP of that 
horse to equal their expected probability. If bettors take SP to equal expected 
probabilities, expected demand for each bookie again equals 
i
i
i ij E α α = ) (  and expected 
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α  (3) 
where E denotes the expectations formed by the bookies.  
Assumption 4 states that each off-course bookie knows the equilibrium price 
set in the on-course market before it closes. We denote the equilibrium price of horse i 
that is observed before the close of the market by  . When the off-course bookie 












































.      (4) 
In this case, the on-course bettors view the horse as at least as hot a favorite as the off-
course bettors. In consequence, the off-course bookies make positive expected profits 
from adopting SP as the quoted price.  








































  .       ( 5 )  
  Here, the off-course bookies have negative expected gains from the horse. 
Moreover, in this case, their books are not balanced and this breaches Assumption 1. 
However, each bookie knows that he can influence SPi by plunging. Since the other 
bookie faces, in expectation, the same demand for that horse, each bookie predicts 












17 If, in response, the on-course bookmakers decrease the price of any 










, then the off-course bookmakers 
respond in the same way with regard to that horse as well, so that eventually, were 
there sufficient time remaining before the start of the race for complete adjustment to 
equilibrium, the price of all runners would be either greater than or equal to the share 
of bets placed on them in the off-course market. Now, since on-course bookies 
presumably only change prices when there is sufficient time remaining for further 
bets, it is reasonable to assume that no horse’s price will fall sufficiently in response 
to an off-course bookmaker’s plunge, on a different horse, to necessitate a further 
plunge for which there is insufficient time.   
As a consequence, under Assumptions (1) – (4), selling SP bets allows the 
bookies to make non-negative expected profits on each horse, whereas he would make 
zero expected profits if he offers bets at fixed odds. The intuition that drives this result 
is simple: By deferring the decision to the on-course market, the off-course bookies 
can make expected profits on horses that off-course bettors favor more than on-course 
bettors. As long as they collude tacitly to offer SP, they can also use their market 
power to hedge against expected losses on horses that on-course bettors favor more 
than off-course bettors.  
                                                 
17 Note that plunging the horse helps the bookies to hedge their own risks, so plunging does not create 
a public good dilemma. 
  10To prove that SP pricing is indeed an equilibrium, it remains to be shown that 
the bookies cannot gain from deviating, and that off-course bettors indeed take SP to 
equal expected prices. 
 First we show that the bookies cannot gain from deviating. Assume that 
bookie 1 announces his prices to be SP, and bookie 2 considers deviating. This can 
only be profitable to bookie 2 if he sets his price to be below the expected SP price. 
Assume that bookie 2 announces that for ticket i, the price is set below its expected 











i . In this case the demand for horse   would 
equal  
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 At the same time, if he sets the price below the expected probability, it follows that: 













 .  
Substituting this result in the bookie's profit function (equation (2)), it follows that the 
expected profits of bookie 2 are negative and his book is not balanced. This breaches 
Assumption 1, and therefore cannot hold in equilibrium. This is true for the price of 
any horse, and therefore bookie 2 cannot gain from deviating.
18  
Considering the bettors, being rational, they know the incentives of the 
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Since off-course bettors use all the information available to them, the best 
expectations they can form is to expect the on-course bettors to have the same 
                                                 
18  Note that even if bookie 2 is insensitive to breaching Assumption 1, bookie 1 would find that he 
earns no money on horse i  and that he can therefore improve his situation by selling ticket   at a 
lower price: and therefore even if bookie 2 agrees to increase his personal risk, the situation is not an 
equilibrium.  
i
  11expectations. It thus follows that the off-course bettors expect SP prices to equal their 
expectation. Thus, although they know the incentives of the off-course bookmakers, 
betting at SP prices is as worthwhile for them as betting according to their own 
expectations. Betting with the pari-mutuel also involves betting at odds which are 
determined only at the time the race begins, and thus betting with the pari-mutuel 
does not a priori improve their expected returns. Off-course bettors could therefore 
increase their profits only by collecting more data and betting at fixed odds either on-
course or with off-course bookies shortly before race time; however it seems that for 
most bettors the costs associated with doing so exceed the gains. 
  Although SP betting is not a unique Nash equilibrium in the model, it 
is evidently preferred from the standpoint of the off-course bookmakers. In addition, 
the historical conditions have also favored the emergence of SP betting as the 
common betting price.
19 Once it became accepted, then its properties as an 
equilibrium solution explain its persistence and robustness over time. 
 
C. Empirical hypotheses, data and tests 
1. Empirical Hypotheses   
The theoretical model developed in section B predicts that off-course bookies 
will intervene in on-course markets when horses which are heavily backed by off-
course bettors receive a lower price in the on-course market.  
Our model implies that the off-course bookmakers are most likely to intervene in the 
on-course market close to the time that it closes, by plunging those horses that are, in 
terms of their profit considerations, under-priced and, thereby, raise their prices. Since 
off-course bookmakers who offer SP exist in the UK but not in Australia, and since 
the two markets are similar in most of their other features, this leads to the following 
testable hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 1: OPs in the UK will be higher than elsewhere, but SPs in the 
UK should not be significantly different than in other markets with a similar level of 
competition. 
This motivation for this hypothesis comes from Shin (1991, 1992 and 1993) 
and Schnytzer and Shilony (2005) who show that on-course bookmakers increase 
opening prices (OPs) in response to an increase in the rate of plunges. As the latter 
                                                 
19  See for example:http://excite.gamblingtimes.com/writers/jcoates/jcoates_winter2001.html 
  12paper shows, by raising the opening prices the bookmakers give themselves a greater 
margin for adjusting prices in response to plunges. It is also shown that starting prices 
are mostly determined by competition considerations and that their level is therefore 
independent of the threat of plunges. Our model predicts that in the UK, plunges are 
performed by both informed bettors and off-course bookmakers whereas in Australia 
plunges are only made by informed bettors. Thus we predict that there are more 
plunges in the UK and this should drive UK on course bookmakers to offer higher 
OPs. 
Hypothesis 2 considers the effect of intervention by off-course bookmakers on 
the favorite-longshot bias. Shin (1991, 1992, 1994), Vaughan-Williams and Paton 
(1997), Schnytzer and Shilony (2003, 2005) and Bruce and Johnson (2005) show  that 
bookmakers tend to increase not only their OP in response to the threat of  plunges, 
but that the threat of plunges also makes them accentuate the favorite-longshot bias. 
We therefore predict that because our model predicts that there should be more 
plunges in the UK, the UK should also exhibit a greater extent of favorite-longshot 
bias in its opening prices than the Australian markets. Moreover, without the 
intervention of off-course bookmakers, the actions of bettors with superior inside 
information should reduce the favorite-longshot bias by the time that the betting 
period closes (Crafts, 1985, Hurley and McDonough, 1995, Sauer, 1998, Gandar et 
al., 2001). However, if there is a group of bettors (such as off-course bookmakers) 
which plunges horses in accordance with the betting patterns of uninformed bettors, 
then they will counter the effect of the informed traders. We therefore predict that the 
UK market should present a higher level of favorite-longshot bias than other markets. 
This hypothesis is supported by the recent findings of Johnson and Sung (2006) who 
report that the favorite-longshot bias in the UK is sufficiently severe to permit the 
existence of profitable wagering rules even at SP.  
In addition, the model predicts that off-course bookmakers have an incentive 
to intervene in the on-course market when the prices of runners that are favored by 
off-course bettors drop in that market. In such cases, the off-course bookmakers have 
an incentive to plunge those horses and force the on-course bookmakers to raise the 
relevant prices.
20 If this hypothesis is true, then we should find that horses whose 
price fell and then increased in the late stages of the betting, should be over-priced 
                                                 
20  Dowie (1976, p. 140), mentions that: "instances of manifestly imperfect equilibrium are the focus… 
of complaints by both smaller off-course bookmakers and… punters." 
  13relative to their true winning probabilities. And there will be other horses whose 
prices fell in consequence, to the point where they are now under-priced. If, on the 
other hand, the markets are efficient and the changes in prices arise in consequence of 
new relevant information, then we should find that the starting prices of all runners 
should be the best predictors of performance. We are therefore led to the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Runners whose prices fell and then rose in the UK market should have 
a starting price that is too high relative to their actual performance. In contrast, horses 
whose prices rose and then fell should have starting prices low relative to actual 
performances. We do not expect to find a similar pattern in markets without off-
course SP betting.  
 
2.  Data 
Our testing procedure involves comparing the UK on-course bookmakers’ 
market with similar data collected from the Australian on-course betting market. The 
difference between these markets is that SP betting is illegal in Australia and off-
course betting is dominated by the pari-mutuel.
 21 In most other respects, the two 
markets are similar, with off-course bookmakers in both countries offering the same 
types of bets. In addition, the two on-course markets share many common features: In 
both markets there are about the same number of bookmakers who compete among 
themselves and with the pari-mutuel. Prior research reveals that in both markets there 
is similar activity on the part of insiders (Schnytzer and Shilony, 1995, Vaughan-
Williams and Paton, 1997, Gandar et al., 2001, Bruce and Johnson, 2005). Further, 
unlike, for example, the Hong Kong market, both the Australian and UK betting 
markets reveal the same patterns of biases, including the favorite-longshot bias 
(Busche and Hall, 1988, Sauer, 1998).  
The database we use for the UK contains information on all flat races with six runners 
or more held in the UK over the entire 1995 season, which was provided by 
Timeform. This data set includes information on 39,098 runners that took part in 
3,562 races. We compare these data with two different data sets on the bookmakers’ 
market in Australia that derive from the CD version of the "Australasian Racing 
                                                 
21 Concerns have been expressed in the UK as to whether SP betting is really fair. For example: Crafts 
(1985), p. 303 quotes a home office report that expresses concern over "…whether punters should be 
unreasonably penalized for their ignorance."   
  14Encyclopedia '98." The first data set contains information on all the flat races with six 
starters or more run at Metropolitan race tracks in Australia in the 1997/8 season. It 
includes data on 43,056 runners that took part in 3,654 races. Since Metropolitan 
races tend to attract large audiences, offer large prizes and attract considerable media 
attention, this data set may be expected to exhibit the smallest degree of bias and also 
to offer relatively fewer opportunities for insiders (Vaughan Williams and Paton, 
1997 and Bruce and Johnson, 2005). This implies that for some of the tests we 
perform, comparing this data set with bets on races that took place at all the UK 
racetracks would be expected to yield conservative results.  
Thus, in addition, we use another data set that includes observations on all the 
flat races with six runners or more run in the state of Victoria in the 1997/1998 
season. This data set is more similar to that of the UK in terms of prize money and in 
the combination of large and small tracks, although some Victorian tracks are 
certainly smaller and more remote than any of those found in the UK. This is evident 
from the far greater variance of prize money relative to the average in the Victorian 
market as shown in Table 1. It is possibly a more natural benchmark for comparisons 
between the UK and Australian markets than the Metropolitan market. Thus, if the 
existence of SP betting in the UK is of no particular consequence and the main force 
that drives prices is the beliefs of bettors and the existence of insiders (Shin, 1991, 
1992), then we would expect the UK results to fall somewhere between those 
provided by the two Australian markets.   
All data sets include information on opening and starting odds offered on each 
horse and on its actual place in the race. For some runners, the data sets also include 
information on their price at some mid-point in the betting. This information is 
apparently made available, in general, for horses whose price did not change 
monotonically during the betting period. That is, this information is given for runners 
whose prices decreased in the first stages of the betting period and then increased or 
vice versa.
22  
  Table 1 provides summarized data for the three markets. 
 
***  Table 1 about here   *** 
                                                 
22  In the full data set that includes information on the UK, Victorian and Metropolitan meetings 
throughout Australia, there were only 164 cases where the middle price was given for horses whose 
middle price was between their OP and SP.  
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2. Results: 
  Testing Hypothesis 1: The presence of bettors who are willing to place large 
sums of money on horses (plunges) is a risk to bookmakers who must hedge 
themselves against this contingency. Under our hypothesis that off-course 
bookmakers in the UK have an incentive to plunge horses whose price drops on-
course during the betting period, it follows that UK on-course bookmakers face a 
greater risk of plunges than do their Australian counterparts, where off-course 
bookmakers are not a source of concern. We therefore predict that the average OP 
should be higher in the UK. To test this hypothesis we first define the Opening Price 
of horse i that participates in race j,  , as the price of a contingent claim to £1 in the 
event that horse i wins. Defining   as the opening odds for runner i in race 
ij p
ij O j , then 










  We summarize the data on OP in the three data sets and compare them by 
using both a t-test and the Mann-Whitney test. Table 2 summarizes the results: We 
find that the average opening prices of runners in the two Australian samples are 
significantly lower than in the UK at the 1% level.  
 
***  Table 2 about here  *** 
 
To check further that the higher opening prices in the UK are a response to plunges 
and not the result of less competitive markets, we compare the average SP prices in all 
the markets. Under the common assumption in the literature that on-course markets 
are competitive (Shin, 1993, Vaughan Williams and Paton, 1997, Schnytzer and 
Shilony, 2004), the starting prices should be set at a level that gives on-course 
bookmakers zero profits. The average level of SP should therefore be independent of 
the rate of plunges. Table 3 summarizes our findings. The results indicate that the 
starting prices in the UK are, on average, higher than in the Australian Metropolitan 
races but lower than in races held in Victoria. The lower average starting prices in the 
Australian Metropolitan races may be explained by the fact that the Australian 
Metropolitan races are larger than most of the races in the UK and attract higher 
prizes, higher media attention and a large number of bookmakers. However, the 
  16starting prices in the UK markets are lower on average than the starting prices in 
Victoria. This implies that the UK on-course bookmakers’ market is at least as 
competitive as the Victoria market. This may be explained by the presence, in the 
Victorian data set, of remote race tracks which attract far fewer bookmakers and 
whose markets are thus not very competitive. Nevertheless, despite the more intensive 
competition, the Opening Prices in the UK are, as we showed in Table 2, significantly 
higher, which further strengthens our assertion that they are set in order to allow UK 
bookmakers greater maneuverability in response to plunges than that perceived as 
necessary by Australian on-course bookmakers. 
 
***  Table 3 about here  *** 
 
Testing Hypothesis 2: According to this hypothesis, the favorite-longshot bias will be 
more pronounced in the UK market than in other markets. To test this hypothesis we 
use a similar methodology to that employed by Gandar et al (2001).
23 This 
methodology relates the returns from each runner to the odds offered on it by the 
bookmakers. We define the opening net returns ( ) from runner   in race  ij OR i j  as the 
net returns from placing a £1 bet on it at the opening price in race  j . That is, the 
opening returns to runner   in race  i j  equal its opening odds in the case that it wins 
the race and -1 otherwise. Similarly we define the starting net returns ( ) as the 
returns for placing a £1 bet on a runner at its starting price. We test for the existence 
of a favorite-longshot bias by running regressions where the explained variables are 
the net opening and starting returns and the explanatory variables are the relevant 
odds; if there is no favorite-longshot bias there should be no correlation between the 
odds set by the bookmakers and the returns. If, on the other hand, there is a favorite-
longshot bias in the data, then there should be a negative correlation between the odds 
and the returns, indicating that low probability (high odds) runners are over-priced. 
Since we are interested in comparing the favorite-longshot bias between the UK and 
both the Australian Metropolitan and the Victorian data sets, we created two data sets: 
The first combines the observations from the UK with observations from the 
Australian Metropolitan races and the second combines all the observations from the 
UK and Victoria. We defined two dummy variables, Metropolitan and Victoria for 
ij SR
                                                 
23  We also performed the test suggested by Bruce and Johnson (2005) and obtained similar results. 
  17differentiating between observations from the UK and observations from 
Metropolitan races and from races in Victoria. For each data set we then ran two 
regressions: one checking for the existence of a favorite-longshot bias in opening 
prices and one testing for the existence of a favorite-longshot bias in starting prices. 
To check for the difference between the UK and the Metropolitan and Victorian races, 
respectively, we added dummy and interaction variables to control for possible shifts 
in the intercept and in the slope. This gave us four equations of the following 
structure: 
i ij Odds Dummy Dummy Odds R ε δ δ β α + × × + × + × + = 2 1  
where R  is either OR or SR, Odds is the relevant odds type (opening odds or starting 
odds) and Dummy denotes either the Metropolitan dummy or the Victoria dummy, as 
appropriate. 
   Since the net returns are censored at -1 we use Tobit regressions and we 
clustered observations by races because the returns on horses in each race are not 
independent.
24
  The results for the opening net returns are reported in Table 4 and for the 
starting net returns in Table 5. The results support our hypothesis. There is a 
significant favorite-longshot bias in the opening prices in all three data sets as 
indicated by the negative coefficient of the opening odds in all the regressions. 
However, the favorite-longshot bias which is captured by the slope of the regression is 
significantly more pronounced in the UK, as predicted by our hypothesis and as 
indicated by the positive sign of the interaction coefficient. In addition, the favorite-
longshot bias is smaller in all data sets at SP prices, but we find that the smallest 
decrease occurs in the UK.   
 
  ***  Table 4 about here  *** 
 
  ***  Table 5 about here  *** 
 
  An alternative explanation for the stronger favorite-longshot bias in SP in the 
UK is that insiders bet less in the UK, and that the bias in OP is the result of some 
phenomenon other than a response by bookmakers to the threat of plunges. To control 
                                                 
24 We also ran the regressions under more general hetroscedasticity assumptions. The results remained 
virtually identical. 
  18for such a possibility, we employ Shin's (1993) procedure to estimate the share of 
inside money in the different markets. Shin (1993) developed a model that relates the 
sum of starting prices in a race and the share of bets places by insiders with superior 
information. The model is based on the assumption that insiders have perfect foresight 
and therefore always bet correctly. Shin (1993) shows that bookmakers respond to the 
existence of such superiorly informed bettors in a way that makes the total sum of 
starting prices depend on the number of horses in a race. Vaughan-Williams and 
Paton (1997) also employ this procedure and report that it is a reliable indicator of 
insiders' activity. We therefore employ this procedure for the three markets with 
which we are concerned and report the estimated share of insider trading in each of 
the markets in our data sets. The results are reported in Table 6. Our estimate of 
insider share in the UK is of the same magnitude as those of Vaughan-Williams and 
Paton (1997) and somewhat greater than those reported by Shin (1993). However our 
data set includes many more races than Shin's, which might explain most of the 
difference (Vaughan and Paton, 1997). Table 6 also indicates that the share of insider 
trading in the UK is somewhat larger than in the Australian Metropolitan meetings, 
which is to be expected, given the smaller returns for insider information in races with 
relative high public and media attention (Vaughan and Paton, 1997, Bruce and 
Johnson, 2005). Further, the share of smart money in the UK is a little less than in 
Victoria as is to be expected from the greater opportunities for insiders offered in rural 
Victoria. However, the differences between the three markets are small. Thus, it is 
unlikely that it is the activity of inside traders that induces the different favorite-
longshot biases in the three markets. This strengthens our hypothesis that the bias is 
induced by a force that exists in the UK but not in Australia. 
 
  ***  Table 6 about here  *** 
    
  The tests on Hypotheses 1 and 2 provide evidence for the existence of an 
element that affects the UK market in a way that does not exist in the Australian 
markets. We therefore turn to Hypothesis 3, which tests the possible effects on the 
prices of runners that are seen by on-course bettors (including the informed bettors) as 
having a low probability of winning. Our theoretical model suggests that in such 
cases, the off-course bookmakers may have an incentive to intervene in the market 
  19and push the prices of those runners by plunging them. As a consequence, the starting 
price of such runners should over-estimate their ability. In markets where there is no 
such intervention, then prices may vary randomly during the betting to reflect changes 
in information. In such markets, the starting price should be the best predictor of 
outcomes, and the pattern of changes in the prices should not contain any extra 
information. More specifically, we use the middle prices that we have in the data set 
to define two dummy variables: 
up_down, which equals 1 if the middle price of a runner is higher than both its 
opening and starting price and down_up, which equals 1 if the middle price of a 
runner is lower than both its opening and starting price.  
We then multiply these dummies by the absolute value of the difference between the 
middle and starting odds, so that we have a measure of the relationship between the 
change in the odds and the winning probability of the runner. We use these variables 
to estimate the following regression:
25
+ × × + × + = − ) ( abs _ 1 ij ij ij ij ij Modds Sodds down up Sodds SR δ β α  
                                                            ij ij ij ij Modds Sodds up down ε δ + − × × + ) ( abs _ 2
26
where Sodds are the starting odds and Modds are the middle odds, This is a similar 
regression to the one we used to test hypothesis 2; however, our main interest here is 
in the coefficients,  1 δ  and  2 δ  : a negative and significant coefficient would allow us 
to reject the null hypothesis that runners whose prices fell and then rose during the on-
course betting have the same winning probabilities as other horses in their price 
group. We estimate the regressions using the Tobit estimation procedure, and we 
assume that observations are clustered by races.  The results are reported in Table 7, 
and they are as predicted by our hypothesis. Thus, in Victoria and in the Australian 
Metropolitan races, the pattern of changes in the prices during the betting period is not 
significant as a predictor of the returns when starting prices are included in the 
regression. In the UK, however, horses whose prices fell and then rose are 
significantly over-priced. The greater is the difference between their middle and 
starting prices, the less likely are those horses to win: this is inconsistent with the 
assumption that the changes in the prices between middle and starting prices are the 
                                                 
25 Following a comment by one of the referees, we also estimated those regressions by giving greater 
weight to observations with high odds by using the logs of the prices (as in Law and Peel, 2002). This 
procedure gave similar results, and we thus report the results of the simpler to interpret regressions. 
26  ) ( Modds Sodds abs −  stands for the absolute value of the difference between the Starting and 
Middle odds. 
  20result of new information. It does, however, support our hypothesis that off-course 
bookmakers try to increase the prices of runners that are favored by off-course bettors 
but not by the bettors on-course. Furthermore, horses whose prices initially rose in the 
UK - indicating the presence of positive inside information, but then fell - suggesting 
that other horses had been plunged by off-course bookmakers, forcing the on-course 
bookmakers to raise the odds of non-plunged horses in an attempt to balance their 
books, were under-priced (albeit at a 10% level of significance) and thus had an 
increased probability of winning.   
 
  ***  Table 7 about here  *** 
D. Conclusion 
  In this paper we study the optimality of SP betting for off-course bookmakers 
in the UK. We do so by presenting a model that combines elements from Rotemberg 
and Saloner (1990) together with Shin's (1991, 1992) and Schnytzer and Shilony's 
(2004) models of horse betting bookmaking markets. Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) 
show that when sellers in a repeated game face demand uncertainty, they may tacitly 
collude. We thus extend their contribution by showing that this also applies to an 
environment where both sellers and clients face uncertainty about outcomes.   
More specifically, we analyze the UK off-course bookmaking market, where 
most betting is carried out at Starting Prices. We show that despite the fact that selling 
bets at SP seems to violate the common assumption that bookmakers profit by 
offering fixed odds and maintaining a balanced book, i.e. by adjusting odds to reflect 
the share of bets placed on each horse, it may be reconciled with profit maximization 
in a concentrated market, because it enables bookmakers to form an implicit cartel. 
Indeed, selling bets at SP is especially suitable for coordinating implicit collusion; as 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) note, in order to maintain tacit collusion sellers have to 
set easy to follow prices and maintain them over long periods. Starting prices clearly 
comply with this rule because, by definition, they are a fixed reference price which 
cannot be changed directly by the actions of a single off-course bookmaker.  
  Our model implies that this tacit collusion increases the profits of the off-
course bookmakers by allowing them to influence the prices in the on-course market 
in their favor. We test some empirical implications of the model by comparing the UK 
  21market with similar on-course bookmaking markets in Australia, the difference being 
that in Australia SP betting is illegal. We find evidence that the UK market is different 
from the Australian markets in ways that are consistent with the implications of our 
model. Especially, we find evidence that UK markets are less efficient in ways that 
may be explained by the existence of a large bettor (or a few large bettors) that make 
prices in the market overstate the winning probability of runners that on-course 
bettors back less than merited by the final, pre-race prices. This evidence strongly 
supports our hypothesis that the UK market is different from other markets owing to 
the intervention of large off-course bookmakers who offer SP betting. This also leads 
the UK bookmaking market to be less efficient than other markets, in the sense that 
prices convey less accurate information than in Australia. Thus, the intervention of the 
off-course bookmakers may be against the interest of the bettors, given that betting is 
a zero-sum game.  
Our findings are consistent with other recent findings in the literature on the 
UK bookmaking market that show that the biases in that market are larger than in 
other markets and might be large enough to violate, in practical terms, weak-form 
efficiency. For example, Gabriel and Marsden (1990) report that betting with the Tote 
(pari-mutuel) gives bettors consistently higher revenues than betting with bookmakers 
at SP.  Johnson and Sung (2006) also report that the UK market is less efficient than 
other betting markets, and that the biases in SP may be large enough to allow positive 
expected profits. These finding are inconsistent with the assumption that SP represent 
equilibrium prices (Dowie, 1976), but our findings suggest a possible explanation for 
this seeming anomaly; namely, the existence of large bettors who bet in proportion to 
bets placed by the uninformed public.  
  An important caveat is that our findings are for the 1995 UK season. It is 
possible that changes in the market structure that have occurred since of the 
introduction of on-line betting and the fact that SP betting is currently losing  some of 
its former popularity may have lessened the motivation for off-course bookmakers 
tacitly to collude.
27   
 
                                                 
27  See for example: http://www.expertform.com/betting.htm. 
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Table 1: Number of horses is the total number of starters. The average prize money is 
given in UK pounds (For observations on races run in Australia we converted the 
prize money to UK pounds at the then ruling exchange rate between the Australian 
dollar and the UK pound, which averaged 0.47 £/Aus$.  Standard deviations are in 
parenthesis. 













AVERAGE OP  .0.121 0.124 0.127 
S.D. 0.   0969 0.097 0.   098
Whitney-Mann 15.52***  6.854***   
t-test 8.73***  3.9***   
Table 2: Comparing Opening Prices (OP) in the UK and Australia. The column 
marked as Metropolitan gives the results for runners in all the Metropolitan meetings 
in Australia in the 1997/8 season. The Victoria column gives the results for runners 
participating in all races held in Victoria during the 1997/1998 season. The UK 
column is for all the runners in the UK during the 1995 season.  
The line marked as Whitney-Mann gives the value of the Whitney Mann test for 
comparing the relevant data set with the data set on the UK races. The t-test line gives 
the value of the t-test for equal means in the UK and the relevant Australian data set. 
***- significant at 1%. 












AVERAGE  SP  0.105 0.1199 0.113 
S.D.  0.092 0.096 0.097 
Whitney-Mann 15.52***  -13.185***   
t-test 11.38***  -10.21***   
Table 3: Comparing Starting Prices (SP) in the UK and Australia. The column 
marked as Metropolitan gives the results for runners in all the Metropolitan meetings 
in Australia in the 1997/8 season. The Victoria column gives the results for runners 
participating in races held in Victoria in the 1998 season. The UK column is for all 
the runners in the UK in the 1995 season.  
The line marked as Whitney-Mann gives the value of the Whitney Mann test for 
comparing the relevant data set with the UK. The t-test line gives the value of the t-
test for equal means in the UK and the relevant Australian data set. 
***- significant at 1%. 
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Table 4: Favorite-Longshot bias at OP 
 
 
   Victoria  Metropolitan 




Opening Odds × Victoria dummy  0.222*** 
(0.023) 
 
Victoria dummy  -1.65*** 
(0.238) 
 
Opening Odds × Metropolitan dummy    0.325*** 
(0.069) 






2 χ   4349.63*** 3734.75*** 
Table 4: The results of  Tobit models estimating the favorite-longshot bias in the 
three markets. Dependent variable: the returns to each horse on each race calculated 
according to its Opening Prices (OP). The Victoria column gives the results of a 
regression which includes observations from the UK and Victoria. The Metropolitan 
column gives the results of a regression on all observations from the UK and the 
Australian Metropolitan races. Opening Odds × Victoria (Metropolitan) is an 
interaction variable that measures the marginal effect of a change in the odds in 
Victoria (Metropolitan) as compared with the effect in the UK. Standard deviations 
are in parenthesis.  
***- significant at 1%. 
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Table 5: Favorite-Longshot bias at SP 
 






Starting Odds × Victoria dummy  0.114*** 
(0.023)   
Victoria dummy  -1.65*** 
(0.238) 
 
Starting Odds × Metropolitan dummy    0.   389 *** 
(0.069) 
Metropolitan dummy    -3.298*** 
(0.   592 ) 
Constant  -12.428*** 
(0.233) 
-15.27*** 
(0.   49 3) 
2 χ   4380.15*** 4454.11*** 
 
Table 5: The results of  Tobit models estimating the favorite-long shot bias in the 
three markets. Dependent variable: the returns from each horse on each race 
calculated according to his Starting Price (SP). The Victoria column gives the results 
of a regression which includes observations from the UK and Victoria. The 
Metropolitan column gives the results of a regression on all observations from the UK 
and the Australian Metropolitan races. Opening Odds × Victoria (Metropolitan) is a 
an interaction variable that measure the marginal effect of a change in the odds in 
Victoria (Metropolitan) as compared with the effect in the UK. Standard deviations 
are in parenthesis.  
 ***- significant at 1%. 




Table 6: Share of Insider Money in Total Betting 
 
 UK  Victoria  Metropolitan 
z- the share of 




0.   0241441 *** 
(0.
0.022071




N  3,562 3,981 3,654 
2 R   0.9339 0.   9198 0.9103 
 Table 6: The share of  insider money in each of the markets according to Shin's 
(1993) model. The value of z is the coefficient of n-1 in the regression: 
  
Where   is the deviation of the sum of SP from 1 in race i,   is the number of 
runners in race,   is Shin's variance of winning probabilities in race i and. 
i k
k
i k i k
k




0 ) 1 (
i D i n
i V i ε  is a 
random error (see: Shin, 1993 for the full derivation of the theoretical model).  
*** significant at 1%. 
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Table 7: Changes in Mid Prices as predictors of Profits 
 
 































2 χ   1800.4 957.1 275.97 
N 39098  44361  43056 
Table 7: Dependent variable: actual profits from betting £1 on each horse. down_up 
is a dummy which takes on the value of 1 if the middle price of a runner is smaller 
than both its opening and closing prices. up_down is a dummy variable receiving the 
value of 1 if the middle price is higher than both the opening and starting prices. The 
UK column gives the result of the regression on all the UK observations, the Victoria 
column gives the result of the regression on all the Victoria observations and the 
Metropolitan column gives the result of the regression on all the observations in 
Australian Metropolitan races. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
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